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 Abstract – Denial by an organisation to improve its processes 
can cause nonconformities and defects. This paper, as a 
critical component of an ongoing research for military 
aviation organisations, proposes a quality improvement 
method for the reduction of variability that exists in safety 
processes and other organisational issues of a system that 
has an impact on human factors performance. The overall 
thesis requirement is a revised, more comprehensive military 
pilot’s error framework. The intent is to start to bridge and 
compare existent Flight Safety programmes among 
NATO/EU Air Forces and show how a tailored Safety 
Management System can be realised. This paper’s outcome 
documents meaningful recommendations for military 
operators to further improve flight safety in combat 
training, by equipping them with a standard template for 
measuring their pilots’ safety performance and their 
progress towards performance excellence. However, the 
methodology is based on a hypothetical but also 
“reasonable” example. 
 
Keywords–Aviation Safety, Human Factors, Safety 
Management Systems, Quality Improvement, Air Force. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The aim of this paper is to present the concept 
methodology used for a scientific multi-national research 
in order to further improve flight safety and safety culture 
in NATO/EU Air Forces. As a first step, in what will be a 
quality improvement process, this paper argues that for 
military organisations that train their own people, human 
factors performance must be mostly viewed in terms of 
the organisational context in which it takes place [1]. 
Therefore, from the organisational perspective, human 
errors and subsequent accidents and incidents are believed 
to occur when high ranking managers and supervisors fail 
to set up and quality assure basic conditions within the 
organisation that promote flight safety [2].  
 Additionally, this paper argues that although the 
existing aviation safety agencies regulations, guidance 
and applications are mainly directed to civil aviation 
authorities, many of these may also be applicable and 
ideally mandatory to military organisations. Since 2009, 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has 
required through productive cooperation, coordination 
and exchange of ideas and data, the implementation of 
effective Safety Management Systems (SMS), Fatigue 
Risk Management Systems (FRMS) and State Safety 
Programmes (SSP), thus providing civil aviation 
authorities with all the necessary tools for the related 
safety oversight and training courses.  
 On the other hand, NATO/EU Air Forces have 
proposed and established over the years numerous other 
Safety Programmes, Safety Cases and Operational Risk 
Management (ORM) models for developing flight safety 
in combat training, defining and aligning competitive 
advantage.  Overall, it is difficult to get an overview to 
classify and value all these flight safety management 
systems, tools, models and programmes. Undoubtedly, 
NATO/EU Air Forces formally give the impression of 
pursuing a goal to maximise their aviation safety 
performance. However, it appears that to date each 
military operator has developed their programme in 
isolation, and independently followed a different path in 
order to achieve what should be a common goal.  
 An Air Force Safety Programme is different from a 
Safety Management System (SMS). An SMS is primarily 
both proactive and predictive. It is one method of 
requiring certificate holders to carry out their own safety 
risk and quality management. It considers hazards and 
risks that impact the whole organisation, as well as risk 
mitigation controls. On the other hand, a military flight 
Safety Programme is primarily reactive and typically 
focuses on only one part of the system – the Air 
Operations. As part of a hypothetical Air Force’s SMS 
implementation, policies must be established, hazards 
must be identified and mitigated, and the system 
monitored for Acceptable Levels of Safety (ALoS). An 
SMS must be tailored, formalised, documented, and 
become the key embedded element of a military aviation 
organisation’s safety culture.   
 However, it is to be expected that not all Air Force 
organisations will implement an SMS with quality 
characteristics that are identical from unit to unit, since no 
two SMS can ever be identical. The main reason for this 
is the existing organisational variability in both flight 
operations and current safety processes among NATO/EU 
Air Forces. One of the sources of this variability is the 
way the operators perform their tasks.  Therefore, if safety 
specification limits are set without regard to the inherent 
variability that exists in safety processes and other 
organisational issues of the system that impacts on human 
factors, this will result in a flawed and non-effective SMS.  
 The following methodology, exemplified by the 
“Deem the Métis” model, proposes a quality improvement 
method for the reduction of organisational safety process 
variability in an ICAO SMS implementation within Air 
Force organisations. By managing all safety risks to 
remain at a level as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP) and by providing measurable ways of assuring 
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this, the model should be an integral part of any flight 
safety programme, focused on human factors issues and 
performance. In the end, will NATO/EU Air Forces 
achieve an acceptable sigma level of quality by adopting 
SMS? That is really not the question. The question is: 
“How much are existing flight safety process variations 
and defects costing?” 
 
II. THE HYPOTHESIS 
 
 The traditional definition of quality is based on the 
viewpoint that products and services must meet the 
customer requirements [3]. Therefore, the following 
assumption, adjusted to this paper, tackles a quality 
management issue: 
 
 “An international organisation (i.e. ICAO), released 
a generalised Acceptable Means of Compliance with the 
regulations (i.e. SMS guidance), which can provide 
services (i.e. Flight Safety and Safety Culture), to 
specified service providers (i.e. NATO/EU Air Forces) in 
order to further improve their human factors performance 
(i.e. accident and incident rates) and consequently reduce 
the organisational cost (i.e. direct and in-direct)”. 
 
 Human factors performance, and consequently 
accident and incident rates, remains a challenging 
problem for military aviation organisations. To address 
such a persistent quality problem, numerous flight safety 
programmes have been autonomously proposed and 
implemented, focused mainly on controlling related safety 
processes. However, Deming’s 14 points [4] and Juran’s 
Breakthrough Management [5] supplementary could 
emphasise “project by project” approaches that may be 
used to solve a chronic problem through organisational 
change. Accordingly, NATO/EU Air Forces may use an 
improvement process instead of a control process for 
addressing a chronic waste, something that may 
concurrently achieve a breakthrough to an improved level 
of quality. Furthermore, quality (Q) is inversely 
proportional to variability (V).  
   
     Q= 1/V                                          (1) 
 
 Excessive variability in safety processes and other 
organisational issues that have an impact on human 
factors performance often results in waste and cost. If 
variability decreases, quality increases and the 
organisational cost and waste decrease. In addition, 
quality improvement is the reduction of variability in 
processes or in other words the reduction of waste. Thus, 
Air Force organisations need both high quality safety 
guidance and a high quality safety process.  
 Assume that aviation organisations have acquired 
high quality guidance (i.e. ICAO SMS). It is evident that 
there is an emerging need for a high quality safety process 
in order that the safety specification limits finally reach a 
high sigma quality. Therefore, by further improving the 
safety process we avoid the “a priori” waste effort and 
cost [6]. ICAO SMS has four fundamental components, 
namely Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety 
Assurance and Safety Promotion [7]. Presuming a single 
NATO/EU Air Force with a 6σ safety process level, the 
probability to adopt any specific SMS unit as non-
defective will be equal to, 
 
                   Psingle = (0.99)4 ≈ 96%                               (2) 
 
 That is, about 4% of the SMS elements will be 
defective. But, if the same Air Force has a current 3σ 
safety process level then, the probability that any specific 
SMS unit is non-defective will be equal to, 
 
   Psingle = (0.93)4 ≈ 75%                              (3) 
 
 That is, about 25% of the SMS elements will be 
defective, something which is not an acceptable safety 
situation. Consequently, rather than attempting to simply 
implement a basic and generic SMS, it is essential  to 
improve the existing safety process and other 
organisational issues that may have an impact on human 
factors performance. But, where really is the safety 
process level of this specific Air Force today? What level 
of improvement is being sought, and what level is 
achievable? This is why the best informed stake holders 
from within the examined NATO/EU Air Forces should 
be involved in the project, in order to: 
 
-  define the desired safety specification band (i.e. LSL 
& USL),  
-  define the Air Force’s critical to quality 
characteristics (CTQs), 
-  reduce organisational variability in key quality 
characteristics to a level at which failure or defects are 
extremely unlike and, 
-  reduce variability in the flight safety process so that 
the specification limits are at least six standard 
deviations from the mean.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 Assuming, a potential NATO/EU Air Force’s 
objective or “safety target value” is as follows: 
 
“Adopt ICAO SMS with the ambition to achieve in the 
next 3 years 6σ +/- 1.5σ human factors performance level, 
equal to 3.4ppm (i.e. accident rate) and, the criterion is 
50% annual improvement in safety quality level”. 
 
 Certainly, this objective is an opportunity for 
improvement but, any process improvement should 
encompass the reduction in existing variation. Other than 
to reduce variation, the operator must first be able to 
measure it in order to establish both where the human 
factors performance level is today, and which are the 
safety risks affecting the organisation.  Thus they can 
identify possible corrective actions to be taken over time 
  
to reach the overall desired goal. Obviously, denial or 
failure of a military aviation organisation to improve this 
safety process can also cause SMS non-conformities and 
defects. 
 The following methodology, illustrating in fig. 1 by 
the “Deem the Métis” model, concentrates on statistical 
process control (SPC), Design of Experiment (DOE) and 
Six Sigma tools useful in quality improvement. As an 
example, the methodology’s primary objective is the 
systematic measurement and reduction of variability in 
the key CTQ characteristics of the flight safety process 
(i.e. fatalities and/or hull loss), and the ICAO SMS quality 
or in other words, aiming to identify the vital few “safety 
indicator values” standing between the safety process and 
target performance. To start, a detailed System 
Description for a NATO/EU Air Force organisation will 
set off the project with the aim of providing a better 
understanding of the environment and the existing safety 
culture in which it operates.  
 Next, System Measurement looks at the accuracy and 
precision (i.e. variation) of the measurement system: 
flight safety indicators, people involved in flight safety, 
and the existing safety process for taking measurements.  
SPC is the statistical technique which will compare the 
current safety process output against a historical aircrew 
accident template covering the last ten years, (i.e. 2001-
2010). The template will be based around a centre safety 
indicator value within standard measures of variation, or 
of the characteristic being measured (i.e. accident rates 
due to pilot’s error), as shown in fig. 2. Also, a frequency 
distribution bar chart (i.e. histogram) may reveal patterns 
in pilot’s performance which measure the central 
tendency of data, as shown in fig. 3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: ‘Deem the Métis’ model 
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Fig. 2: Accident Rates due to pilot error / 100,000 flying hours  
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Fig. 3: Accident Rate Frequency distribution 
  
 In addition, with statistical methods the standard 
deviation (σ) could be determined and accordingly the 
values could be plotted in a control chart. The objective is 
to keep the current process stable, within these control 
limits, and to limit variation within them. The Xbar chart 
for this paper’s example is shown in fig. 4. Subsequently, 
the specific Air Force may determine the accident rates 
due to pilot error that are acceptable to the organisation, 
meaning to determine the Lower and Upper specification 
limits (LSL and USL). What this specific Air Force 
should initially look for, is to fit six standard deviations 
inside the LSL and USL.  
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Fig.4: Accident Rates due to pilot error Xbar chart 
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Fig. 5: Upper and Lower Specification Limits  
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   Fig. 6: Process Capability Analysis for Data 
 
 
              
                  Fig. 7: Capability/Performance indexes rule  
 
 
 
Fig. 8: The missing waste 
 
 If data from the current process approaches formation 
of non-random patterns within the limits, then appropriate 
action to control the process is taken. At this stage, 
Process Capability may also look at short term capability 
and long term performance of the process with regard to 
customer specifications, as shown in fig. 5. A Process 
Capability Analysis for data will show the estimated short 
term (i.e. within) capability and long term (i.e. overall) 
performance, shown as an example in fig. 6. For the 
pilot’s performance or Capability Evaluation the standard 
indexes are used (i.e. Cp, Pp and Cpk, Ppk ). The capability 
and performance indexes may be converted to ppm (i.e. 
accident rates due to pilot error per 100,000 flight hours) 
and will determine the variation in this process. The 
variation of this paradigm’s safety process will illustrate 
the sigma pilot’s performance level that the Air Force 
currently has; the reader may need to follow fig. 7.  As a 
next step, the flight safety process may define the Lower 
and Upper Control limits (i.e. LCL and UCL) based on 
accident data collected, and should establish metrics; that 
is, the ability of this process to achieve certain results (i.e. 
if the process is capable or incapable). Again, control 
charts should be the primary process monitoring 
technique used at this stage. It is also possible at this 
point that the specific Air Force will not meet the 
desirable flight safety specifications, since the average 
data based accident rates due to pilot error are outside of 
the potential band. However, as for the present scenario, 
the minus 0.28 difference in existing variance is the 
defect, the unknown factor (i.e. the waste in safety 
process) that was missing, as shown in fig. 8. At this 
point, a GAP Analysis may identify which of the 
components and elements of an SMS are currently in 
place, and which must be added or modified to meet the 
SMS requirements. In addition, GAP analysis results will 
be compared with national and international requirements 
for establishing a tailored SMS. Consequently, FMEA (as 
shown in fig. 9), and Pareto methodologies could prove 
useful in determining the root causes of the 
inconsistencies found in the system. Then, the overall 
initial human factors performance objective (i.e. safety 
target value) may be re-defined.  If the process still looks 
as “not capable”, corrective action may follow standard 
continuous improvement (i.e. DMAIC) procedures. This 
method could root out the waste by examining every 
process step and measuring the results. The goal at this 
phase is to identify what steps were causing accident rate 
variance and the vital few factors (i.e. safety indicator 
values) standing between the process and the desired 
target performance. A design of experiment (DOE), such 
as the factorial design, is extremely helpful at this point in 
discovering those factors influencing the CTQ 
characteristics of interest in the process. Three DOE 
factors in this safety process focus on: Unsafe 
Supervision, Organisational influences and High Rank 
Management commitment. 
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Fig. 9: Cause and Effect Diagram 
  
  Finally, the ‘Deem the Métis’ model also presents 
the final process as a system with a set of inputs and an 
output. In our case, the controllable input factors 
x1,x2…xp are process variables such as the type of 
training a pilot receives, the specific rules and safety 
policy that the organisation imposes on the operating 
units, the number of aircrews involved, the total flight 
hours and accident rates in each time period. The inputs 
z1, z2….zp are uncontrollable or difficult to control 
variables such as mission environment, mission risk level, 
pilot experience and safety culture and mission abort 
criteria. The overall flight safety planning process may 
transform the inputs into a finished product that has 
several quality characteristics. The output variable Y is a 
quality characteristic, meaning a measure of an endless 
safety process based on human factors performance and 
on high quality ICAO SMS guidance.  
 
IV. CONSTRAINTS - RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Without a doubt, the overall thesis project is subject 
to a number of constraints. In an effort to overcome 
potential complexities, it will be beneficial to consider the 
following suggestions, prior to promulgation of a 
common NATO/EUAF Safety Management System rule.  
 Formation of an independent National or EU-driven 
Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA).    
 Coordination Plan that the MAA should develop and 
promulgate to personnel in key MoD positions, with set 
priorities.  
 Regulation for protecting SMS safety information and 
proprietary data against disclosure and inappropriate use. 
 Assigned Accountable Executive who will be finally 
responsible for the efficacy of the safety process and other 
organisational issues of the system that have an impact on 
human factors performance. 
 Reliable planning group within each NATO/EUAF 
organisation responsible for implementing the SMS 
framework.  
 
V. EPILOGUE 
 
 The role of human error in aviation accidents and 
incidents is well established, with previous studies 
reporting that between 70% and 80% of aviation accidents 
result from some type of human error [8]. Most of these 
accidents occurred not only in poorly organised aviation 
operators, but also in prestigious, war-experienced and 
combat ready Air Forces, such as many within 
NATO/EUAF. The described example methodology, 
exemplified by the “Deem the Métis” model, aims to 
defend a proposal in the critical domain of aviation safety, 
to fill gaps in existing research, to cross military 
departmental boundaries and to extend understanding in a 
particular topic, such as Flight Safety in Combat Training. 
In addition, a quality improvement method was proposed 
for the reduction of organisational safety process 
variability in a hypothetic ICAO SMS implementation 
within Air Force organisations.  
 Moreover, many military aviation organisations are 
influenced by common EU/NATO security policies and 
contribute to the field missions and military capabilities 
concept. Since interoperability is one of the main 
challenges which are unmoving in debate among several 
EU/NATO member countries, Flight Safety in Combat 
Training may be one of the key elements that should be 
addressed. Nevertheless, a further key research question is 
whether a commonality-driven model or just a further 
quality improvement in existing national safety 
programmes will be more beneficial to NATO/EU Air 
Forces, and adequate to promote flight safety.  
 Nevertheless, the described methodology may apply 
equally to any civil or military aviation organisation 
implementing SMS, by only modifying the safety 
indicators and safety target values according to their 
safety needs. With the aim to produce and document 
meaningful recommendations to enable military operators 
to begin addressing the overall problem of achieving an 
Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS), the overall potential 
thesis aims to establish to what extent NATO/EU Air 
Forces should take account of fundamental components of 
SMS, such as Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management 
(SRM), Safety Assurance (SA) and Safety Promotion. At 
least, this paper’s outcome may add an important step to 
this effort.  
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